ITALIAN LITERATURE SINCE 1848.

III.

PHILOSOPHY.

There is a profound distinction between Greek philosophy—the philosophy of the ancients—and modern philosophy, a distinction which determines its progress. The ancient was objective, the modern is subjective: *i. e.*, the former sought the laws of being and of the external world; the latter seeks the laws of thought, the origin of ideas; in other words, the principal object of Greek philosophy was to know that which is outside of us, in order to place it in relation with ourselves; while the object of modern philosophy is to know that which is within us, in order to place it in relation with that which is outside of ourselves. Both the one and the other proceed toward the cognition of the Absolute, the Necessary, the General, the One, the ultimate scope of philosophy; both availing themselves of natural faculties—reason, consciousness, sensation, intuition, etc., as sole criterion of truth. During the interval that separates these two philosophies, there arose a third, known by the name of scholastic or dogmatic, which became the official philosophy of Catholicism. The dogmas of the Catholic creed, derived from immediate divine revelation, constitute the foundation of certainty, the criterion of truth, the point of departure from which that philosophy proceeds in its deductions and demonstrations. Consequently, all that remains for us to seek, is, according to dogmatic philosophy, known and declared; all that for the human intellect is but a problem, for dogmatic philosophy is an axiom. Thus, the principle of infallible and absolute authority, founded on the dogmas of the Catholic Church, takes the place of the sovereignty of reason. Dogmatic philosophy consists in a gymnastic exercise of the intellect, which, starting from *a priori* principles, arises by means of syllogisms at conformable conclusions. Realism, Nominalism, Mysticism are the denominations of the three schools into which dogmatic philosophy is divided. Aristotle supplied the materials and the speculative instruments to each. The most celebrated Italian dogmatists were San Bonaventura, Pietro Lombardo, and, greater than all his predecessors or successors, San Tommaso d'Aquinio. The first office of modern philosophy was the demolition of dogmatism, the emancipation of thought. Telesio, Campanella, Patrizi, Francis Bacon, commenced that demolition by means of Sensationalism and the Inductive method, Pomponazzi and Vanini by criticism, and Ficino and Bruno by Emanatism and Pantheism. They destroyed and constructed at the same time, depositing germs which were developed in successive periods. Descartes, with his celebrated proposition, I THINK THEREFORE I EXIST, gave the formula of modern philosophy. He fixed the immutable basis of certainty in Thought; hence the subjective character of modern philosophy. Doubt carried to the extremes of Pirrhonism is impotent to shake this foundation, for he who doubts thinks and exists. But how do we think? What is the origin of our ideas? What are the relations between subject and object; between thought and being? These are the problems that philosophy has set itself to solve from Descartes' day to our own.

In this new field philosophy opened out two paths. On the one hand Locke maintained that ideas owe their origin to sensation, that the *me* is pure thought, is not an innate idea. Leibnitz, on the contrary, asserts that sensation is insufficient; that the intellect contains in itself necessary and general ideas, to produce which experience does not suffice, since it can only furnish us with contingent particular ideas. Sensationalism and Idealism are then the two great ramifications of Modern Philosophy. Along these two diverging paths philosophers sought the relations that exist between thought and being. The Sensationalists arriving at skepticism with Hume, or at a vulgar empiricism with Condillac, soon lost all philosophical value. The Idealists arrived at an absolute idealism with Fichte—*i. e.*, at subjective pantheism, which reduces all that exists to the *me* and its modifications. But it is indisputable that outside of the thinking *me* there is something real which philosophy ought to include in its speculations—ought to place in its true relations with the *me*. "Without the *thee*," said Jacobi, very pertinently, "the *me* is impossible."

Treasuring up all the results of philosophy, and especially those won from Kant's time to his own, Hegel carried the science to a higher point than it had ever before attained. He formed logic and metaphysics into one inseparable science. According to him the laws of Thought and the laws of Being are identical; for him the Absolute consists in the loftiest conception of Being. Schelling shows that Hegel puts logical conception in the place of living reality—*i. e.* that from the purely logical ideas he pretends to educe the real world, and this without adducing any proof; without demonstrating how the subjective idea passes to the real world; what are the actual relations between Thought and Being. Be that as it may, to Hegel belongs the great merit of having carried his speculations into the field of Religion, of Æsthetics; into the field of Universal History, whose ascending development he proved, and established the great truth that liberty is the substance and essence of the human mind; of having demonstrated in his History of Philosophy the progressive continuity of that science.

Thus Idealism assumed the true character of Science—, gradually modified, became the genius of the philosophy of the nineteenth century. It is now acknowledged as a fundamental truth won to philosophy, that we are incapable of knowing any being in itself; that ideas alone exist within us; that ideas only represent the attributes of being. Thus philosophy, confined within the limits of the possible, laying aside all vain researches after substance, aims at becoming *The Science of Life*, as Pierre Leroux defines it. The philosophy of the nineteenth century, to avoid being confounded with meager systems which have assumed the name of Idealism, while they are, in fact, mere Ideologies; and also to express by its very title the antithesis of dogmatic philosophy, has taken the denomination of Rationalism—opposing Reason to dogmas, free examination to the principle of authority. Certainty and credibility are the two pillars on which Rationalism, in its most comprehensive sense, rests. Analysis and induction, proceeding from the known to the unknown in order to arrive at synthesis, is the method it adopts. Reason and sentiment are the two functions which guide rationalistic philosophy to the knowledge of that which is certain, to the adoption of that which is credible. And it is in this sense, in our opinion, that Religion and Philosophy become one. Between dogmatism and rationalism there arose a parasitical plant, a sort of philosophical *juste milieu*, which is neither one nor the other—Eclecticism. The Eclectics, headed by Victor Cousin, claimed to be the Bees of philosophy, who, gathering truths from all systems, distribute them in the cells of the philosophical hive, which is Eclecticism. "There exist on all sides," writes Cousin, "different methods, different systems, in psychology, in logic, and in metaphysics; on all sides arise opposition and contradictions, error and truth mingled. The only possible solution of this opposition is to be found in the harmony of contraries; the only way to avoid error is to accept all the truths." (*Introduction à l'Hist. de la Philos.* page 417.)

But the conception, or at least the intuition, of truth is necessary, in order to be able to discern and accept all the truths scattered throughout the various philosophical systems—*i. e.*, it is necessary to have a system, and eclectism is the negation of all system. Eclectic Philosophy, devoid of unity, of a fundamental idea, of a fixed aim, of an ideal, and consequently devoid of progress, is reduced to a patchwork coat of many colors. Apply eclecticism to politics, and you have an idea of its theory. A dole of monarchy, a dole of aristocracy, a dole of democracy, a dole of theocracy. Behold the ideal of a State according to Eclecticism!

To recapitulate: The history of Modern Philosophy (once established the difference which progressively distinguishes it from the ancient) presents us with one species of Philosophy which aims at the perpetuation of the past, *i. e.* Catholic Dogmatism, or reactionary philosophy; with a second species, which adds the present to the past, which considers all accomplished that can be accomplished, all thought in human life that can be thought, *i. e.*, Eclecticism or stationary philosophy; and with a third species, which accepts the past as past, feels that what remains to be accomplished exceeds all that has been accomplished, what remains to be thought exceeds all that has been thought, *i. e.*, Rationalism, an essentially progressive philosophy.

This premised, let us see to which category belong the philosophical works published in Italy since 1848. Although Catholicism has its headquarters in Italy, though dogmatic philosophy is taught in all the schools by Jesuits, priests, and friars, Italian genius, owing to its innate power, has preserved its independence during three hundred years of political and religious slavery; has soared so far beyond the doctrines of the Romish Church, affronting its tortures and its stakes, that human progress has not been enriched by a single great idea which has not originated in Italy; from Galileo, who uplifted mechanics to a science, who opened the heavens to astronomy, to Alessandro Volta, who gave a new direction to physics and to chemistry; from Bruno, the initiator of modern philosophy, to Vico, the revealer of the philosophy of history.

ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

Yet amid the herd of Jesuits, priests, and friars, the chiefs of dogmatism, we note, even in our own time, two great minds, Antonio Rosmini, who died in 1855, and Vincenzo Gioberti, in 1853. Both acquired great renown in Italy, and contributed but too powerfully to her misfortunes, inundating her with sophisms, striving to reconduct her to the times of Gregory VII., by means of more than fifty volumes on "*The Origin of Ideas*," "*Psychology*," "*Natural Law*," "*Anthropology*," "*The theory of the Supernatural*," "*The moral and civil pre-eminence of the Italians*," "*The Good and the Beautiful*," the Civil Regeneration of Italy, and on many other subjects, Polemics, Theology, Morals, etc., etc.

Both Rosmini and Gioberti based their speculations on the dogmas of the Catholic Church, accepting them as theorems to be demonstrated; both agreed that philosophy is the servant of theology, and proceeding along two different lines, arrived at the same conclusions. Rosmini kept to the analytical method, and used psychology as an instrument; Gioberti adhered to the synthetical method, and used ontology as an instrument. Both quarreled on the road, and ended by demolishing each other. Rosmini proved the Real Being of Gioberti to be an absurdity, while Gioberti devoted three volumes to demonstrate the nullity of the Possible Being of Rosmini. Each succeeded in vanquishing his adversary, because their mutual error consisted in the point of departure and the point of arrival of their respective systems. Meanwhile the Jesuits on the one hand lauded the modern Plato to the skies, while the Jansenists on the other extolled the modern Aristotle. The crowd of pedants and idiots applauded Abbot Plato and Abbot Aristotle, while Italy, stunned by the clatters, almost believed them to be such, and alas! in one of the most solemn moments of her political life, placed her hopes of liberty in the Pope, and forgetting Dante, hailed Gioberti as the prophet of the nation.

Rosmini, in his thirty volumes of philosophical speculations, which form a ponderous introduction to the Catholic religion, starts from the following point: Philosophy is a servant, theology is its master. The psychological method which he followed led him to the affirmation of a possible or ideal being. He first established that existence *per se* is not cognizable—that the only materials of cognizance are the existing individuals of a species; that existence *per se* is only perceived by an act, which act is not in itself cognizance, and differs from that act by which the species and idea is intuitively known. By combining these two acts of the mind, *i. e.*, the dim perception of existence *per se*, and the intuition of the idea, intellective perception is obtained, which is an affirmation, a judgment, convincing us of the reality of a Being, which corresponds to the intellectual object intuitively known by us. All the qualities of things whether accidental or substantial, have equally their intellective essence—the idea; all belong to pure and formal cognizance; strictly speaking, it is only existence *per se* which constitutes the matter of cognizance that is excluded from it. Confronting the various ideas one with the other, the most determinate reenter into the least determinate; while a perfect equation runs between them all, so that an idea determined in all possible modes, multiplied into an infinite number of ideas—this infinite number of ideas is recognized to have preexisted in the indeterminate idea, although it was not therein distinguished. Consequently, by a pyramidical distribution of ideas, placing the most particular and multiple below, and upon these the least particular and least numerous, we ascend of necessity to a primary idea which forms the apex of the pyramid, and comprehends all the rest; which multiplies itself by means of different determinations into all the others. Thus one arrives at the reflected intuition of the idea of an indeterminate possible Being; at the discovery of the true and pure fount of all science. In this way Rosmini unconsciously reached the conclusion of the idealists—God exists inasmuch as we think of Him; then, terrified at the heterodox result of his system (so incapable is Catholicism of a philosophical basis), he sought instantly for a remedy, and plunged into contradictions. "This possible or ideal Being," he says, "is endowed with such characteristics that we are compelled to acknowledge that it is not a created thing, neither is it an appurtenance of any created thing; neither is it God, for God is not a simple idea, and much less is He an indeterminate idea, applicable to anything; hence we must retain the possible or ideal Being to be an appurtenance of God." Hence the contradictions, for if God be a simple and indivisible substance, how can anything accidental exist in him? How, therefore, can the ideal Being be an appurtenance of God?

Failing to find a satisfactory reply, and desirous of preserving intact both his orthodoxy and the results of his philosophical speculations, he takes refuge in a theological sophism. Theology speaks of two lights, the light of God and the light which God sheds upon his creatures; which latter light may be distinguished in three ways—the light of glory, by which man beatifies himself in the vision of God; the light of grace, by which he rises to the comprehension of supernatural things; and the light of nature, by which he discerns the true from the false. These three lights are a sort of participation of Divine light. The light of nature leads to the intuition of the possible or ideal Being, which is an appurtenance of God.

With this idea of the Possible Being thus sacrificed to the exigencies of Catholicism, Rosmini tries to solve all problems. This idea is for him the criterion of certainty; nevertheless it is necessary to have recourse to faith and to grace; to take shelter in the Romish Catechism, in order to be saved from error even in philosophical cogitations. This idea is a principle of morals, and leads to "the art of teaching the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius."

It is a principle of political economy which proves that the new science of political economy leads to Slavery, and that the Pope, Christ's Vicegerent, is the true giver of all good to the human race. This idea is the true principle of politics and of law. Rosmini strives to prove that man, beside being a person is also a thing, and that his right to participate in sovereignty by means of election depends on the quantity of things he possesses in lands or in capital, thus recalling into vigor the feudal laws bequeathed to us by the middle ages. This aim he himself acknowledges. "All my meditations," he writes, "tend to the great object of inducing the human mind to return from the false path into which sin has led it." According to him, the human mind has been straying ever deeper into darkness since Locke published his *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Next came German philosophy, which conducted human thought to the edge of the bottomless abyss; and finally, modern philosophy, which knows neither what it is nor what it aims at.

In order to banish all doubt as to the value of his own doctrines, Rosmini, in each volume, announces that the light of truth has vividly and brilliantly illuminated his mind, and that he is, of philosophy, and, in fact, of all the sciences, the restoring Messiah.

Whereupon the Abbot Gioberti appears on the stage of the philosophical theater, and says to the Abbot Rosmini—Granted, that Philosophy is the servant, Theology the master; but it is not correct to say that God exists, inasmuch as we think of Him. No; He exists, inasmuch as we see Him. Your psychology leads to Pantheism, and is incapable of giving a scientific basis to ontology. The Catholic catechism ought to form the basis of ontology. You, Rosmini mine, have accepted that catechism, but your psychological method leads you into error.

The ontological method, commencing science from God as from the supreme axiom, is not a hypothetical process, because man without God is not a certain but a postulated truth. The Ideal formula, the key to all philosophy, indeed to all knowledge, is the following: "The Being (God) creates existence." From the analysis of human cognitions, it appears that the mind possesses three mental faculties, and that there are three classes of objective realities which correspond to those faculties. Sensibility, which discerns things sensible; internal and external, that is, qualities and their effects; intelligence or reason, which discerns things intelligible, that is, Being; causes and their innumerable relations; and Superintelligence which discerns essences—*i. e.*, things hidden to human cognizance. This latter faculty indicating an order of things which are not simply and rationally—*i. e.*, naturally cognizable—may be called supernatural. By the aid of this faculty man sees The Being and the Creative Act.

In the ideal formula we have ontologically three realities, and psychologically three exceptions—*i. e.*, a substance and first cause. The Being—an organic multiplicity of substances, or second causes—Existences; and a free act of the first and causing substance—Creation. Thus The Being is an ontological primality (primus), and at the same time a psychological primality—*i. e.*, the primary idea and the primary thing: a philosophical primality—or the absolute principle of all knowledge. The Being of Gioberti is, therefore, a Real Being, not a Possible or Ideal Being like Rosmini's.

To the principle of creation is added a correlative principle—a principle of complement, of perfection; in virtue of which, existences revert to the Being from whom they originated. The principle of creation refers to the Being, the principle of perfection to existences, and in consequence of the deterioration of the creature (owing to the apple eaten by Father Adam), this latter principle is transformed into a principle of redemption. Thus we have the absolute primality—the Being at the head of the formula; the other derivative principles form a series of relative primalities. Scientific primality, historical primality, civil primality, and so on.

The progress or regress of the human mind is shown by the maintainance of the ideal formula in its integrity, or by its deterioration. If the formula be maintained in its integrity, we have the predominance of reason—perfect Monotheism, Judaism, and Christianity. Regress commences when the formula becomes deteriorated—thus existences emanate from the Being; then we have the predominance of fantasy, Emanatism. Regress is complete when the formula runs thus: "Existencies are The Being, divided and multiplied," then we have the predominance of sensibility—Atomism, Polytheism, and Atheism.

And when the formula is translated thus: "Existences are the Being, one and indivisible, progress is imperfect, is derived from human power alone," we have the predominance of abstraction—Pantheism.

But here a serious difficulty arises—so serious that it places an insurmountable barrier between Gioberti and his goal. If man be endowed with superintelligence; if he behold God and all his acts of creation face to face, it follows that there is no need of an intermedium between man and God, of what use then is the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church? Gently, cries Gioberti. I said that from the Absolute Primality, from the Being, proceeds a series of relative primalities, and among those the reflective Primality ought to be taken into signal consideration. The faculty of superintelligence, *i. e.*, the intuition of God and of the act of creation, is insufficient without the reflective primality which is the intuition of intuition. The reflective primality, the first link in the chain of reflection is language, and language is not a natural product of man, but an immediate revelation from God—*i. e.*, from the Being, the philosophical or absolute primality. Therefore, in order to know God and the act of creation by intuition, revelation, or the reflective primality, is necessary. There are two species of reflective primalities: the spoken or traditional; the written or Biblical. Genesis and the Gospel form the Biblical primality, and respond in their duality to the principles of Creation and Redemption: Judaism and Christianity, which respond to the two revealed cycles of the Biblical primality: Genesis and the Gospel form the traditional primality, and this traditional primality, guardian and expounder of the Biblical primality, presupposes a hieratic primality, *i. e.* a sacerdotal nation, safeguard of the one and the other; and this primality is the Catholic Church or the Pope, in whom exists the harmonized basis of all science—outside of whom all rigorous encyclopedical science is impossible. But what is the revealed language? That spoken before the confusion of tongues. After that period the revealed language was preserved by the Jews in their synagogues; then in the Catholic Church by the Popes. The Pope, therefore, is the reflective primality, *par excellence*, proceeding from the absolute Primality which is God, the Being. The Being creates existences—The Pope creates civilization, the Pope being materially in Italy; Italy exists spiritually in the Pope; the Pope being the organizing basis of all science, and rigorous encyclopedial science being impossible outside of the Pope—Italy is the organ of sovereign reason, the guardian of all other nations of all languages, because in Italy resides the head that directs, the arm that moves, the tongue that teaches, the heart that animates Christianity. And Rome being more ideal than Italy, Italy than Europe, Europe than the East, and the East than the world; each of these aggregates becomes the ideal container of the altar, as the soul of the body, ideas of mind, and God of the Universe. Italy, therefore, is the nation of nations (*sopra nazione*) the people of peoples (*capo popolo*); the Italians are the Levites of Christianity, and Rome the marvel of the earth.

The political application of this theory to Italy is, that her redemption can come from the Pope alone. The Pope must be the Head, the Soul, the Moderator of a federation of Italian princes. As the Being creates existences, so the Pope creates the Prince, and the Prince the People. Thus Italy is led back to the middle ages, in order that she may regain her supremacy in the double sphere of thought and action!

An exposition of Gioberti's doctrine is the best criticism that can be given on his works. It suffices to bear in mind that the key to his system is the supernatural faculty of the superintelligence with which he has adorned the mind of man—the direct intention of God and the act of creation—in order to form a just estimate of their utility.

TERENZIO MAMIANI.

And here Count Terenzio Mamiani appears and turning to Rosmini says: "It is not true that God exists inasmuch as we think of Him," and to Gioberti, "It is not true that God exists, inasmuch as we see Him. No! We think of Him inasmuch as He exists. I, first and alone among philosophers, will prove his existence *a priori*."

The philosophical system of Mamiani consists in a theory of perceptions and of intellections; by perceptions we know nature, we penetrate into the sensible world; by intellections we know the Being superior to nature, we think of intelligible agents—*i. e.*, of the absolute and its determinations. Between these two facts of cognizance there exists a link in virtue of that natural law of continuity, which gradually conducts the subject from the one to the other, but they form that distinct mental series; the one refers to the finite, to the relative; the other to the Infinite, the Absolute. Sensible objects—individuals, being linked to universal and immutable objects, as a man to humanity—the mind passes unconsciously and instantaneously from an immediate object of perception to an object of intellection, which corresponds thereto; *i. e.*, from the perception of a being to the idea of a being. Thence arises an order of finite realities which are related to a supreme and intelligible reality existent in act, which is God Himself. God, therefore, is the ultimate goal toward which the human spirit moves; and this goal is outside of the mind, and is absolutely objective, because thought places the thing and not the representation or image of the thing as the term of its own act. Hence the conception which it possesses is the idea of the thing, not the idea of the ideas. (*Confessioni d'un Metafisica*, 1856.)

In order to accept Mamiani's demonstrations, by means of which he pretends to have constructed a synthesis between Thought and Being, between the real and the ideal absolute, we need the proof of the relation of the two terms, the proof of the transition from the subject to the object; whereas, in treating of the absolute, he can only adduce a transcendent proof, consequently one that is inaccessible to the human mind. Mamiani tells us that he thinks of the existence of God, but between the thought of the Being and the Being there is neither ideality, nor equation, nor syllogism. It seems to us that the existense of God is felt, but cannot be proved, and therefore that all the exertions of ontology are mere gymnastic exercises, utterly useless in human life. Mamiani is not always consistent in his theories. He professes to be an orthodox Catholic, yet he talks of civil religion, of faith derived from reason, and it is evident that between reason and infallible Catholic authority there is an antithesis, or contradiction of terms. Neither is he always consistent in his applications. In theory he establishes common sense as sole criterion of truth, whence emerge in practice universal suffrage, popular sovereignty, the Republic; but he deduces instead the suffrage of the moneyed classes of the optimists, Monarchy. Previous to, and during 1848, these dogmatic philosophers employed all their influence to induce the Italians to place their hopes of salvation in the Pope and in the King of Piedmont—and, indifferent to the ruin wrought by that fatal trust, Gioberti and Rosmini till the day of their death, and Mamiani till the present hour, have continued their utmost efforts to bewilder the intellects of the Italians in the sphere of ideas, and in the sphere of facts to plunge them into error. Nevertheless, Rosmini calls himself the incarnation of truth, Gioberti announces himself as the reconstructor of philosophy, which, before his time, was unworthy of the name of science, and in fact did not exist, and Mamiani does not hesitate to proclaim himself the first, the sole philosopher among past and present who has resolved the greatest problem of Ontology. Following in their steps come a herd of minor philosophers—Paslatazza, Mancino, Carte, Ventura, Bertini, etc., but our space will not permit us to examine their works.

RATIONALISTIC PHILOSOPHERS—ALFONSO TESTA.

Something now remains to be said of the rationalistic philosophers and of their struggle against dogmatism, which was commenced in Italy in 1829, by Alfonso Testa. A philosopher of no ordinary talent, he is as yet little known to the Italians, for, alas, priests and policemen alone confer celebrity on men in Italy, and this was especially the case previous to 1848. It was natural that they should deny it to a man, who proclaiming the supremacy of reason, placed in the hands of Italy the weapon with which to hurl from her altar the twin idols—the authority of the Inquisition and of the gens d'arme—of the Pope and of the Emperor. In his works, *Introduzione alla Filosofia dell' Affetto, 1829; Della Filosofia dell' Affetto*, 1830; *Della Filosofia della Mente*, 1836, Alfonso Testa affirms that we know nothing save through the channel of our feelings; there exists a power which disposes of us imperiously, in spite of ourselves; which causes us to experience what we call moral affections. That power exists; it is manifestly necessitated by facts, and this ought to suffice us; what need is there to know more? It is but a stupid presumption in us to investigate what things are in themselves; it is a craving after knowledge which does not concern us. "Oh philosophers! you think yourselves sages, and yet I am compelled to compare you to the little child who seeks for the object behind the mirror. The internal structure of things and their latent forces are unknown to us; a body is for us but a collection of qualities which manifest themselves to us by means of the senses. Mind is that within us, which thinks. Let us cease these sterile contemplations of our essence; these researches for the reason of the various moods we undergo. Life is a mystery; we ignore its commencement and its continuation; let us occupy ourselves with the results of our faculties, examine their order and concatenation, and, since we cannot discover the first cause, let us analyze the effects, and extract thence the consequences which may be really useful to us." And on this track all his philosophical system was developed. But the times and the place in which he lived (Testa was Professor at Pincenza) prevented him from going beyond the simple theory, which of itself is insufficient, but must be attacked at the root, and exterminated; the threshold of the temple must be crossed, and the false priests expelled from the tabernacle; a more rational path to the origin and historical developments of humanity must be pointed out. It must be proclaimed that the fount of right exists in the people, and that the duty of conquering it, if it be usurped—of guarding it faithfully, if it be possessed—corresponds to that right.

FERRARI.

Giuseppe Ferrari was the first to appear on this arena, publishing in 1851 a book entitled *Filosofia della Rivoluzione*. The name of Ferrari was already known as the author of other works of merit, and especially for his *Essai sur le principe et les limites de la philosophie de l'histoire* and for *La Mente di Vico*.

Ferrari's criticism attacks and overthrows logic, the scientific column of dogmatism; showing that by subjecting natural things, the thought of man—notions concerning the just and the useful, which govern humanity, to the canons of logic we fall into contradictions and absurdity. Nature changes and is transformed at every moment; therefore, since things never remain the same, they deny the principle of Identity; since they never remain equal to themselves, they violate the principle of equation and render syllogism impossible, because there are no terms which can unite the two states of a thing that changes.

The *me* never remains the same, therefore it rebels against the sovereignty of the three logical forms. According to logic, no relation can be established between the *me* and the thought, and between the thought and the being. Ideas are in communion with themselves; logic necessitating autonomy isolates ideas and renders discourse impossible. Passing actions in review, we see human destiny swaying between the useful and the virtuous. Logically the useful renders the virtuous impossible. So, if we subject God to logic, the same abyss which separates man from nature becomes deeper between man and divinity. From these demonstrations, Ferrari arrives at a different method from that hitherto pursued in philosophy. He would have logic subjected to nature, and used as the instrument of phenomena; thus, he says, we may arrive at the knowledge of the truth. The disorder of contradictions appears as soon as philosophy demands of logic the origin of phenomena. The revelation of nature ought to be the sole guide of philosophy; it acts irresistibly upon the will and on the reason; it ought to make itself master of logic and dominate it. Natural revelation manifests itself necessarily in objects, in life, and in moral inspiration. The theory of Ferrari acts from these points. Nature reveals herself in phenomena; hence Being and Seeming are identical. Appearance is in being when it changes, under the influence of chemical attraction or affinity, or from other causes. It constitutes our own and only *a priori* on which all sciences are founded. Nature lays the foundation, logic gives the superstructure; neither the one nor the other is subject to our will.

The revelation of beings is doubled within us—as many things as there are outside of us, so many thoughts do we discover within us; hence two series of collateral phenomena, internal and external:—physical and intellectual. Perception is the first act of thought, the vision of external and internal objects—it affirms that which appears. Given perception—we go beyond; we reflect, we compare, we abstract, we generalize, and all this is thought. The elements of thought correspond to the elements of objects—that which appears in nature, appears also in the intellect; intellect is the mirror of nature. In thought there, as in things, exist individuals and genera—*i. e.*, sensations and ideas—both acquired, unreducible and indivisible elements. Ideas acquired once have to be reacquired—*i. e.*, drawn from every thought, every perception; then only can they be called abstract, and it is by means of abstractions that generalizations are reached.

Thought, by means of perception, affirms what appears; by means of reflection, affirms that which ought to appear, proceeding from the known to the unknown, from premises to consequences. Given the thought, its movement leads to a system, chance does not dominate thought. The unity of our organizations dominates the variety of appearances.

Error commences when thought departs from reality, when dissidence arises between logic and nature—logic aims at mathematical judgment nature judges arbitrarily. At the moment in which I think, nature changes, hence my thought grows old, before the eternal youth of a nature always new. Error is repaired by a fresh arrangement of our thought, suggested by the revelation which is extended; thus our intelligence rectifies itself, forming a fresh system, which takes the place of the former.

Nevertheless, intelligence remains systematic throughout the indefinite series of dogmas which it accepts and leaves behind. The actual system is true, but it is a relative, therefore mutable truth. Society is a system, and passes from one to all possible systems. Nature forces men into Society. Society is man, who cannot tolerate contradictions, who ever struggles to exclude them, who desires order in ideas, order in the revelation of nature. The unity of the human race is the hypothesis of our life, which evidently aspires at universal association. This is deduced, not only from the revelation of life and of justice, but also from the revelation of beings who suffice of themselves to attract us toward humanity by the material impulse of inventions, discoveries, of arts, and of industry. Applying his theory to history, he deduces that ideal history is one, eternal, in which the particular histories of all nations take place in time. Each people lives on condition of representing one of the moments of ideal life; fast or slow, obscure or glorious, it cannot withdraw from the eternal life of all the peoples. Ideal history from all points of the earth leads to humanity; the diversity of worship issues from its epochs; each worship is a phase of the series of systems, and is a step toward a superior worship, in order to arrive at the religion of humanity. There are no epochs of social incredulity in history; incredulity, like imposture, is an individual phenomenon. What society has ever elevated doubt to a principle? Athwart the change of dogmas, truth progresses, verified by reality—never by abstract criterion. From China to the United States we see in diverse countries the diverse moments of the eternal history of systems displayed, the germs of which exist in the mind of every man. Historical Providence is to be found, therefore, in our thought, which, starting from the data of our organization, progresses; it is to be found uniform in all people, and conducts men gradually toward the only system in which the arrangement of appearances can no longer vary, and in which natural revelation will be recognized in its fullness.

In another book (*La Federazione Republicana*) 1850, Ferrari delineates the new phase to which society tends—i. e., to the progressive propagation of science, which will take the place of the fables and the fatal contradictions of metaphysics. He formulates the law of the historical progress, of natural revelation; establishing three moments—religion, metaphysics, science; which three moments are determined by criticism—religion ignores it—metaphysics admits without recognizing its powers—science admits it in its full extension.

ANSONIO FRANCHI (CRISTOFORO BONAVINO).

Ansonio Franchi considers the specification of the first moment to be inexact, because the character of religion is so common and generic that it cannot, rigorously speaking, be said to belong to one moment of history more than to another, and he calls mythology and poetry the first moment; adds theology to metaphysics in the second period; and, in the third, replaces the term science by a more explicit conception—rational and natural philosophy. Ansonio Franchi has pierced to the very heart of the question—has struck at the very root of dogmatic philosophy—at Catholicism. By dint of a very clear method, he has popularized philosophical studies among the youth of Italy, has divested them of the asperity, the mystic language in which the schoolmen had enveloped them; has destroyed, by inflexible and victorious dialectics, the factitious grandiosity of the systems elaborated by Gioberti, Rosmini, Mamiani, Father Ventura, and other dogmatists. The importance of this work can only be estimated by those who are fully aware of the magic power exercised by those great names over the souls of Italians—of the fatal effect of these theories, rendered attractive by the boundless science of Rosmini and Gioberti, by the pure and elegant diction of Mamiani, in alienating our youth from the pursuit of truth in philosophy, politics, and religion. Of Franchi's powers as a critic, it would be impossible to give a fair sample in the present sketch. Criticism is his forte; in this department his skill is unrivalled, and, in fact, none of his philosophical adversaries have ever accepted his repeated challenges. The titles of his works are: *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane* (1852), *La Religione del Secolo XIX.* (1853), *Appendice alla Filosofia* (1853), *Il Sentimento* (1854), *Il Razionalismo del Popolo* (1855).

In his beautiful introduction to the *Philosophy of the Italian Schools*, he narrates his conversion. "The opinions," he writes, "which I hold to-day are not those in which I was educated, and cannot, therefore, be attributable to the force of habit, or to the effect of prejudice. My boyhood and youth were subjected to the discipline of schools and colleges; my meagre studies in literature, philosophy, and theology were confined within the limits of the strictest and most jealous orthodoxy; my favorite teachers were the Holy Fathers, and especially Tomaso d'Aquino and Alfonso de Liguori; but two passions swayed that period of my life—study and piety; and up to the age of two and twenty, when I was ordained a priest, my only occupations my only pleasures, were reading and prayer. In short, but for the prudent firmness of my father I should have entered the orders of the Jesuits. Recalling these years, at once so happy and so sad; years on which the poetry of youth shed not a single flower or dropped a single smile, undisturbed by a youthful palpitation, my soul shudders at the memory of that state of feverish exaltation, of which a fanatic mysticism had enamored it, but it shudders as at the memory of a misfortune, not of a crime. My faith had preserved all the simplicity, the candor, the abandon of infancy; only those who have passed through similar experiences can understand the mysterious condition of a heart which leads the conscience astray by force of virtue; which denies reason by force of piety, and for love of God voluntarily raves. But my entrance into the priesthood was for me the dawn of a new existence, and it was the confessional that first shed a ray of light across my understanding. Confession inspired me with repugnance; I could not reconcile the moral doctrines of the Catholic Church with the inner voice of conscience. Hence the first assaults of doubt. I felt that my studies had been directed by a sectarian spirit, not by the spirit of truth, and that I must recommence them; a new world, confused as yet, was opening out before my eyes. This task, which produced a profound and ineffaceable revolution throughout my entire nature, at first caused a tremendous struggle against the beliefs which I had sucked in with my mother's milk, which had been confirmed by venerated lips, and against the anathemas of the Church; but soon a calm serenity took possession of my soul and cancelled every vestige of the struggle. When I had examined the doctrines of the various Catholic schools I turned to the principles of the Jansenists; next I consulted Protestant systems, interrogated the philosophy of the past century, pondered the works of modern critics touching religious symbols; and the first indisputable, unimpeachable conclusion in which my mind found rest was this: In Reason resides the supreme criterion of all Truth. This principle established, my intellectual and moral emancipation was complete. This principle led me to the negation of everything supernatural, of all positive theology, of all theocratic authority; it revealed to me the universal law of continual progress of successive transformation, which governs the life of the physical and moral world—of beings and ideas; of nature and of science—of religion and civilization; which restores harmony between the intellect and the heart. Thus peace was restored to my soul—no longer that ephemeral and negative peace which is purchased at the price of ignorance, mortification, and blind obedience, which paralyses the faculties of the spirit and dulls the powers of the body, but a profound and imperturbable peace derived from the free contemplation of truth and from the sentiment of human dignity. Thus have I experienced within myself both the boasted felicity of the believers and the pretended despair of the unbelievers. I have tested alike the consolations and the sweetness of mysticism and philosophy of the church, and humanity, and I do not hesitate to say that I would not exchange one hour of my present happiness for an entire eternity of those delights which deluded my youth."

Ansonio Franchi is a *nom de plume*. Cristoforo Bonavino is the real name of the young philosopher. Franchi teaching in the footsteps of Jacobi in Germany, of Leroux and Lamennais in France, aims to infuse a new spirit into philosophy by basing it on sentiment. Hitherto its cold, meager systems have disgusted the greater part of our studious youth, because they sacrifice the heart to the intellect, because in order to explain man they commence by mutilating him and finish by reducing him to a machine for manufacturing syllogisms.

Sentiment and reason, according to Franchi, are the forces which constitute human life; the grandeur of a people, as of an individual, depends upon the degree of development and intensity to which those forces attain. Human life is one; therefore all the known phenomena are related to one single generic function of the spirit, which is knowledge. Sentiment and reason are the two specific functions of knowledge; thus to it are referable the phenomena which belong to sentiment and which constitute sensible knowledge—the phenomena which belong to reason and constitute rational knowledge. These two functions are distinct though not separate; in every human act, one or the other predominates, but often they intervene together. The products of these two functions form the complex of human activity, which may be reduced to two supreme teachings—religion and philosophy; religion appears to us as a symbol which poetically represents the forces of sentiment, and philosophy as a system which scientifically translates the powers of reason.

The principle of psychological classification consists in the relation of the human mind to things known by that mind; thus classification of functions ought to follow that of phenomena. He speaks of functions not of faculties, because functions signify the cause together with the effect, the force and the act of the subject. From the function of sentiment, sensible knowledge originates; this is subdivided into three distinct degrees. Sensations or exposed sentiments whose terms are those exterior objects which make an impression on the organs of our senses. Imagination, fantastic sentiments whose terms are images and phantasms which reproduce past or far-off objects and renew their impressions; and Ideal sentiments, whose term is an element which unfolds itself in the soul under the influence of sensations and of images, but does not proceed from them, because it entirely transcends the sphere of bodies, and of this element is the good, the beautiful, the true—partial forms and aspects of the Infinite!

Sensation is the link by which man communicates with the nature of the animal. Sentiment is the link by which man commnicates with the nature of God. These phenomena of Sentiment or sensible cognitions, have among themselves a common character, i. e., they are all spontaneous, because the manifestation of Sentiment precedes the apparition of Will; immediate because the knowledge is direct, in sensations, physical contact exists; in imaginations, fantastic; in sentiments, ideal—concrete because every act of the sensitive function points to its object as to a distinct, indivisible reality. From the function of reason originate rational cognitions, these also are subdivided into three distinct grades: Perceptions, which affirm the real relation of terms known as objective and subsistent—Belief, which affirms as real the mere ideal or possible relation of terms in part objective and known, in part objective and unknown—Conceptions, which affirm the ideal or possible relations of terms known as subjective or mental. This order of knowledge has also general and common characters which distinguish it from the preceding. It is reflex, because the mind tends towards the affirmation of the relation of objects; mediate, because the object only comes in contact with reason by means of a judgment or a series of judgments; abstract, because each rational cognition implies something purely intellective. But knowledge does not constitute the entire man, but only one element. Knowledge in man is coordinate with practice, thought with action; for we know in order to do. The practical function of instinct corresponds to the cognizant function of sentiment; the practical function of will corresponds to the cognizant faculty of reason. And between these different cognizant and practical functions we encounter that intrinsic and reciprocal union which resolves itself into the unity of the subject.

It is evident that the Author establishes in sentiment the basis and the principle of all the realities of knowledge, because sentiment gives the first notion of all phenomena, all the vast order of cognitions which embraces corporeal, imaginative and ideal sentiments, which form the matter of science. From the perceptions which furnish the real laws of nature, and from the conceptions which furnish the formal laws, scientific certainty is obtained; phenomenon is the object and experience the criterion of the former; ideas are the object, and reasoning the criterion of the latter; from the former proceed the physical and natural sciences, from the latter logic and mathematics—and since these latter only teach the abstract relations of thought, science is confined within the limits of nature and of phenomena. The author excludes *beliefs* from science because they respond to the desire of reason to know the first cause and the ultimate goal of man and of the Universe; they are but the formulæ of the impulses of sentiment and the symbols of the products of the imagination, and are thus foreign to any scientific process.

Touching the beliefs in the super-intelligible, he admits them, in as far as they do not surpass the orders of nature, distinguishes them from beliefs in the supernatural, which he rejects because they do transcend the orders of nature; he calls them absurd because they affirm a reality, which excludes all the conditions of nature, and admit facts which contradict all the laws of thought. The first are reduced to a